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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Russell Passons appeals from a judgment of conviction upon a jury's 
guilty verdict on two counts of aggravated assault and one count of burglary. 
Passons challenges the district court's ruling allowing evidence of events from 
the day after the crimes were committed, which led to Passons' arrest for those 
crimes. Passons also challenges the district court's denial of his motions for 
mistrial due to a prospective juror's statement about Passons' tattoos during voir 
dire, and a witness's statement at trial to which defense counsel objected and for 
which the district court promptly gave a curative instruction. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Passons walked into a Walmart in Post Falls, Idaho, took a 
carseat/stroller (hereafter "stroller") off the shelf, then left the store without paying 
for it and loaded it into his car. (Tr., p. 161, Ls. 16-23; p. 178, Ls. 14-24.) In 
digital video recordings taken by Walmart cameras, Passons can be seen 
loading the stroller into his gold Oldsmobile Intrigue. (Tr., p. 163, Ls. 4-18; p. 
176, Ls. 4-6; p. 184, Ls. 3-9.) Passons then re-entered the store, loaded a 37-
inch flat-screen television into a cart and again started to leave without paying. 
(Tr., p. 165, L.10-p.167, L. 24; p.178, L. 24-p.179, L. 2.) This time, he was 
approached by two Walmart employees. (Tr., p. 168, Ls. 20-24.) 
When the employees identified themselves, Passons stepped to the side 
of the cart and said, "I ain't stopping for shit. Fuck you. You can't touch me." 
(Tr., p. 169, Ls. 6-9.) Passons then drew a folding knife from his pocket, opened 
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it and pointed it at the employees, then ran into the Walmart parking lot to his 
car. (Tr., p. 169, Ls. 10-13; p.170, L. 21-p.171, L. 6; p.172, L. 23-p.173, L. 
4; p. 208, L. 17 - p. 209, L. 17.) The employees alerted police about the incident 
and provided Passons' vehicle's description, license plate number, and direction 
of travel. (Tr., p. 173, Ls. 7-9.) The employees also sent out an alert about the 
incident, including photos, to nearby Walmart stores, warning them to be on the 
look-out for Passons and the stolen stroller. (Tr., p. 190, L. 13-p. 191, L. 4.) 
The next day, Passons went to a Walmart in Ponderay, Idaho. (Tr., p. 
217, L. 16 - p. 218, L. 25.) Passons drove there with a woman and her 
boyfriend, both of whom Passons met that day. (Tr., p. 228, Ls. 3-15.) In 
exchange for a ride to the store, the woman attempted to return the stroller and a 
set of Legos for Passons. (Tr., p. 227, L. 11 - p. 228, L. 25.) When Walmart did 
not allow her to complete the return, they "left in a hurry and loaded it back in the 
car." (Tr., p. 229, Ls. 17-24.) 
The three hurried off, with Passons driving, to downtown Sandpoint. (Tr., 
p. 231, Ls. 8-13.) Police started following Passons' car, "one after the other" for 
about 25 minutes until Passons hit a curb, deflating the front passenger tire. 
(Tr., p. 231, Ls. 15-23; p. 244, Ls. 14-25.) Police arrested Passons. (R., p. 9.) 
The state charged Passons with two counts of aggravated assault, and one 
count of burglary. (R., pp. 54-56.) Passons proceeded to trial, and a jury found 
him guilty of all three counts. (R., p. 273.) The district court entered judgment 
and sentence, and Passons timely appealed. (R., pp. pp. 315-17, 321-24.) 
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ISSUES 
Passons states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion by allowing the State to 
present evidence of Mr. Passons' actions the day after the charged 
crime? 
2. Did the district court err in denying Mr. Passons' motions for mistrial 
as the jury hearing he was a repeat offender and a suspect in a 
robbery deprived him of his right to a fair trial? 
3. Even if the errors are individually harmless, was Mr. Passons' 
Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law violated 
because the accumulation of errors deprived him of his right to a 
fair trial? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 12.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Passons failed to show the district court erred or abused its discretion 
in allowing evidence of events leading up to his arrest the day after his 
crimes were committed, and that tended to establish his motive, plan, 
knowledge, and consciousness of guilt? 
2. Has Passons failed to show the district court erred or abused its discretion 
in denying his motions for mistrial due to a prospective juror's statement 
about Passons' tattoos during voir dire, and a witness's objected-to 
statement at trial for which the district court promptly gave a curative 
instruction? 
3. Has Passons failed to establish cumulative error that violated his right to a 
fair trial? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Passons Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred Or Abused Its Discretion 
In Allowing Evidence Of Events Leading Up To His Arrest The Day After His 
Crimes Were Committed. And That Tended To Establish His Motive. Plan, 
Knowledge, And Consciousness Of Guilt 
A. Introduction 
Before trial, Passons asked the district court to exclude evidence under 
Rule 404(b) of his efforts to return the stroller, and the ensuing police-chase, the 
day after the charged crimes. (Tr., pp. 114-19; see Augmentation (Notice of 
Intent).) The district court denied Passons' request, allowing the evidence at 
trial. (Tr., p. 136, Ls. 17-24; p. 138, Ls. 12-21.) Passons asserts on appeal that 
the district court's ruling was in error and an abuse of discretion. (Appellant's 
brief, pp. 13-20.) Passons' arguments fail because the evidence to which he 
objected was admissible. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Rulings under Rule 404(b) are reviewed under a bifurcated standard: 
whether the evidence is admissible for a purpose other than propensity is given 
free review while the determination of whether the probative value of the 
evidence is substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice is 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 51, 205 P.3d 
1185, 1187 (2009). 
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C. Evidence Of Events Leading Up To Passons' Arrest Was Relevant And 
Admissible 
Under Rule 404(b), evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is 
inadmissible to prove the character of the defendant in an attempt to show that 
he or she committed the crime for which he or she stands trial. Grist, 147 Idaho 
at 52, 205 P.3d at 1188. Evidence of prior bad acts is admissible if (a) it is 
relevant to prove some issue other than the defendant's character, and (b) its 
probative value for the proper purpose is not substantially outweighed by the 
probability of unfair prejudice. State v. Cross, 132 Idaho 667, 670, 978 P.2d 
227, 230 ( 1999). The second prong of this test only excludes evidence if the 
danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value. State v. 
Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 275-76, 77 P.3d 956, 964-65 (2003). 
1. Evidence Of Events Leading To Passons' Arrest Was Relevant 
And Admissible As Part Of The Charged Crime 
"Rule 404(b) does not prevent the introduction of other misconduct 
evidence if the misconduct was so interconnected with the charged offense that 
a complete account of the charged offense could not be given to the jury without 
disclosure of the uncharged misconduct." State v. Avila, 137 Idaho 410,413, 49 
P.3d 1260, 1263 (Ct. App. 2002). "All facts inseparably connected to the chain 
of events of which the act charged in the information is a part are admissible 
even though the full story shows the commission of other crimes." State v. Izatt, 
96 Idaho 667, 670, 534 P.2d 1107, 1110 (1975) (quoted in Avila, 137 Idaho at 
413, 49 P.3d at 1263). These inseparable facts are "intrinsic evidence ... 
inextricably intertwined" with the crime charged, such that both "are part of a 
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single criminal episode." State v. Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225, 228, 178 P.3d 28, 31 
(2008) (quoting U.S. v. Sumlin, 489 F.3d 683, 689 (5th Cir. 2007) (other citations 
omitted)); see also State v. Whitaker, 152 Idaho 945, 949, 277 P.3d 392, 396 
(Ct. App. 2012). Accordingly, an intrinsic act "is not a prior crime, wrong, or other 
act" under Rule 404(b). & It is instead "physical, circumstantial evidence." kt 
In Sheldon, the defendant's possession of $7,000 in cash was intrinsic evidence 
of the charged crime - trafficking in methamphetamine. & Therefore, "the cash 
was not 404(b) evidence." & 
In this case, the events leading up to Passons' arrest were circumstantial 
evidence, inextricably intertwined with his charged crimes. Passons' attempt to 
return the stolen stroller, flight from the Ponderay Walmart, and arrest in 
Sandpoint, the day after his burglary at the Post Falls Walmart are part of a 
single criminal episode, without which a complete account of the charged 
offense could not be given. (See R., pp. 17-19; Tr., p. 226, L. 12 - p. 232, L. 5.) 
Thus, Rule 404(b) is inapplicable and evidence of the events leading to Passons' 
arrest was admissible as part of his crime. 
2. Evidence Of Events Leading To Passons' Arrest Was Relevant 
And Admissible, Under Rule 404(b), To Passons' Motive, Plan, 
Knowledge, And Consciousness Of Guilt 
Even if the admission of the disputed evidence is controlled by Rule 
404(b), Passons has failed to show error. As to the first prong under Rule 
404(b), evidence is admissible if relevant to show "proof of motive, ... intent, ... 
plan, [or] knowledge." 1.R.E. 404(b); see also State v. Phillips, 123 Idaho 178, 
845 P.2d 1211 (1993); State v. Gauna, 117 Idaho 83, 87, 785 P.2d 647, 651 (Ct. 
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App. 1989). Whether the evidence is relevant is a legal issue reviewed de nova. 
State v. Brummett, 150 Idaho 339, 342, 247 P.3d 204, 207 (Ct. App. 2010); 
Sheldon, 145 Idaho at 228, 178 P.3d at 31. The facts of Passons' case are 
comparable to those in Brummett, in which the defendant was charged with 
burglary at a Shopko, and the state presented evidence Brummett had 
committed prior thefts from other Shopko stores. Brummett, 150 Idaho at 342, 
247 P.3d at 207. 
"Burglary is defined as entry into a store with intent to commit any theft or 
any felony." Brummett, 150 Idaho at 342, 247 P.3d at 207 (citing I.C. § 18-
1401 ). In Brummett, the Court noted, "[t]he state had the burden of proving that 
Brummett intended to steal when he entered the store," and concluded, 
"Brummett put the question of his intent upon entering the store squarely at 
issue." kl at 343, 247 P.3d at 208. The Court held, "[t]he Rule 404(b) evidence 
was relevant to a material disputed issue concerning the crime charged, other 
than propensity." kl 
Here, Passons' theft of the stroller was evidence of burglary because it 
showed his intent to commit theft of the television when he re-entered the 
Walmart immediately after stealing the stroller. (Tr., p. 271, Ls. 12-24.) Also, 
Passons' attempt the following day to return the stroller for store credit was 
relevant to his motive or plan, per Rule 404(b). (See Tr., p. 162, L. 16 - p. 163, 
L. 3.) Passons' effort to return the stroller supports that he had a motive or plan, 
upon re-entering the Post Falls Walmart, to steal high-value items and return 
them for store credit. 
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Passons' flight from police after leaving the Ponderay Walmart was also 
relevant under Rule 404(b). "Rule 404(b) allows evidence of other acts if 
admitted for the purpose of showing knowledge or consciousness of guilt." State 
v. Pokorney, 149 Idaho 459, 463, 235 P.3d 409, 413 (Ct. App. 2010) (citing State 
v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 279, 77 P.3d 956, 968 (2003)). Idaho courts have 
found evidence "of flight [or] escape" admissible to show consciousness of guilt. 
.!sL (citations omitted). Passons' flight from police, which ended when he blew-
out his front passenger tire, forcing him to stop, demonstrates his consciousness 
of guilt, both for his actions that day and the day before. Accordingly, Passons' 
actions fleeing from police were also relevant under Rule 404(b). See Pokorney, 
149 Idaho at 463, 235 P.3d at 413. 
3. Passons Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its 
Discretion In Balancing The Probative Value Of The Disputed 
Evidence Against Its Prejudicial Effect 
"Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury." I.R.E. 402. The district court's weighing of the 
evidence's probative value against its prejudicial effect is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion. Grist, 147 Idaho at 51, 205 P.3d at 1187. In reviewing a district 
court's discretionary decision for abuse, the appellate court considers whether 
the court below (1) understood its decision was discretionary, (2) acted within the 
scope of its discretion and consistent with applicable legal standards, and (3) 
exercised reason in reaching its decision. State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 
363, 247 P.3d 582, 590 (2010) (citation omitted). 
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Passons has failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion. 
As already discussed, the district court's ruling was consistent with applicable 
law. Before announcing its ruling, the district court heard argument from both 
parties and took a recess to review the applicable law. (Tr., pp. 114-138.) The 
district court engaged in a Rule 404(b) analysis and excluded evidence of drug 
paraphernalia, but allowed the evidence at issue here. (Tr., p. 133, L. 12 - p. 
138, L. 24.) The record demonstrates the district court was aware its decision 
was discretionary, and that it exercised reason in rendering its ruling. 
Accordingly, Passons has not shown the district court erred or abused its 
discretion in allowing the challenged evidence. 
11. 
Passons Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred Or Abused Its Discretion 
In Denying His Motions For Mistrial 
A. Introduction 
Passons argues he was denied his right to a fair trial due to two events at 
trial. The first was a prospective juror's comment about Passons' tattoos during 
voir dire. (Appellant's brief, pp. 24-27.) The second was a police officer's 
statement during her testimony, to which counsel objected and for which the 
district court gave a curative instruction. (Appellant's brief, pp. 25-27.) Under 
the applicable standard of review, and in light of the entire record, Passons 
cannot meet his burden of showing error, let alone reversible error. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The issue on review of a district court's ruling denying a motion for mistrial 
"is not whether the trial court reasonably exercised its discretion in light of the 
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circumstances existing when the mistrial motion was made." State v. Ellington, 
151 Idaho 53, 68, 253 P.3d 727, 742 (2011) (quoting State v. Field, 144 Idaho 
559, 571, 165 P.3d 273, 285 (2007); State v. Frauenberger, 154 Idaho 294, _, 
297 P.3d 257, 263 (Ct. App. 2013). Rather, the question is "whether the event 
which precipitated the motion for mistrial represented reversible error when 
viewed in the context of the full record." 19.:. (citations omitted). The focus of 
appellate review "is upon the ultimate impact on the trial of the incident that 
triggered the mistrial motion." 19.:. "The trial judge's refusal to declare a mistrial 
will be disturbed only if that incident, viewed retrospectively, constituted 
reversible error." 19.:. 
"Error is not reversible unless it is prejudicial." State v. Gutierrez, 143 
Idaho 289, 293, 141 P.3d 1158, 1162 (Ct. App. 2006) (citing State v. Urquhart, 
105 Idaho 92, 95, 665 P.2d 1102, 1105 (Ct. App. 1983)). The event triggering a 
mistrial motion must be both prejudicial and deprive the defendant of a fair trial, 
to warrant a mistrial. I.C.R. 29.1 (a). Also, an error is harmless if the reviewing 
court can declare beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have reached 
the same result absent the error. 19.:. 
C. The Prospective Juror's Statement About Passons' Tattoos During Voir 
Dire Did Not Amount To Reversible Error 
In this case, a prospective juror told the trial judge during voir dire, 
... this is kind of embarrassing to say, but if he's a defendant, I 
work in a bar. He's already covered in tattoos. He's been in and 
out of jail more than I can count. Those aren't normal tattoos that 
people just get for decoration. I've already formed an opinion of 
him. I honestly don't think I can give him a fair trial. 
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(Tr., p. 19, L. 21 - p. 20, L. 2.) The trial judge responded, "Well, I don't know 
that I agree with your conclusions, but that's not important. ... " (Tr., p. 20, Ls. 3-
4.) The prospective juror continued, "I know about the difference between 
decorative and -" and the trial judge interjected, saying, "That's quite all right. 
Thank you very much . . .. Why don't you go ahead and step down and I will 
excuse you." (Tr., p. 20, Ls. 6-10.) Defense counsel requested an immediate 
sidebar at which he moved for a mistrial. (Tr., p. 20, Ls. 11-13; p. 76, Ls. 11-14.) 
Passons argues the prospective juror's comment deprived him of a fair trial. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 24-27.) However, Passons' argument is unsupported by 
the record or applicable law. 
"A juror is presumed to be impartial," and "even a juror's expression of his 
own opinion of the case during voir dire does not render him partial." Ellington, 
151 Idaho at 69,253 P.3d at 743. In Ellington, three prospective jurors- none of 
whom ultimately sat on the jury - expressed opinions during voir dire that they 
believed the defendant was guilty. lfi at 68-69, 253 P.3d at 742-43. The Court 
in that case noted, "At worst, the jurors who actually deliberated received a 
second-hand opinion from those three prospective jurors . . . . They did not 
receive any specific facts as to why, other than that the prospective jurors read 
about it in the paper and in one instance interacted with a member of the 
[victim's] family." Id. The Court continued, "The impaneled jurors were 
instructed at the end of voir dire that they were to decide the case only based on 
the evidence presented in the courtroom," and they "were again instructed of this 
duty before their deliberations." lfi 
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In State v. Laymon, a prospective juror said during voir dire, "Well, I think 
he's guilty already." 140 Idaho 768, 769, 101 P.3d 712, 713 (Ct. App. 2004). 
The trial court gave a curative instruction including that "each person is 
presumed innocent unless and until they are found guilty by proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt." kl The trial court denied Laymen's motion for a mistrial. kl 
at 770, 101 P.3d at 714. On appeal, the Court noted, "there is no evidence that 
the jury here did not follow the trial court's instructions. The potential juror who 
uttered the statements at issue was removed, and there is no evidence that her 
statements had but a passing, inconsequential effect on the remaining pool 
members." 19.:. at 771, 101 P.3d at 715. The Court concluded, "Laymon was not 
deprived of a fair trial because of the potential juror's statements," adding, 
"Indeed, the purpose of voir dire is to discover which, if any, of the potential 
jurors are unable to meet the demands such service requires." kl "[T]he 
potential juror identified herself as unable to serve [and] was thereafter removed 
. . . . Because there was no continuing impact on the trial, the district court did 
not err in denying Laymon's motion for mistrial." kl 
The holdings in Ellington and Laymon apply here. All jurors selected to 
serve on Passons' jury were questioned by the court and counsel about their 
ability to be impartial. (Tr., pp. 13-67.) The district court instructed the jury at the 
start of trial, 'The law requires that your decision be made solely upon the 
evidence before you. Neither sympathy nor prejudice should influence you in 
your deliberations." (Tr., p. 149, Ls. 19-21.) The district court further instructed, 
"In determining the facts, you may consider only the evidence admitted in this 
12 
trial," which consists of "the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits offered and 
received, and any stipulated or admitted facts." (Tr., p. 149, L. 24 - p. 150, L. 3.) 
At the end of trial the district court again told the jury, "You are to decide the 
facts from all the evidence presented in the case," which consists of the 
witnesses' testimony, exhibits admitted into evidence, and facts stipulated by the 
parties. (Tr., p. 265, Ls. 5-11.) 
The prospective juror here claimed a generalized knowledge of non-
decorative tattoos, based on her work "in a bar." (Tr., p. 19, L. 22 - p. 20, L. 7.) 
The prospective juror did not purport to know Passons or anything about 
Passons personally. Thus, the disputed comments here were of less concern 
than those in Ellington, which were based on information pertaining to Ellington's 
case. 151 Idaho at 68-69, 253 P.3d at 742-43. As in Laymon, the prospective 
juror here was unable to meet the demands of service on the jury and was 
excused. 140 Idaho at 771, 101 P.3d at 715. 
Jurors are presumed to be impartial and to carry out their sworn duty to 
apply the law to the facts borne out at trial. Ellington, 151 Idaho at 69, 253 P.3d 
at 7 43. Jurors are also presumed to follow the instructions given by the trial 
court. State v. Thumm, 153 Idaho 533, 544, 285 P.3d 348, 359 (Ct. App. 2012). 
Accordingly, it is presumed that the jurors here followed the trial court's 
instruction regarding what evidence the jury should consider. Although the trial 
court did not immediately instruct prospective jurors to disregard the disputed 
comment, the record does not support that the defense requested a curative 
instruction or that doing so would have better addressed Passons' concern; an 
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instruction immediately after the comment would potentially have drawn undue 
attention to it. See Laymon, 140 Idaho at 771, 101 P.3d at 715 (although the 
Court on appeal found no error, Laymon argued the trial court's curative 
instruction about charges dismissed prior to trial "served only to reinforce the 
potential juror's statements.") To the extent any jurors heard or considered the 
disputed comment at the time it was made (during voir dire), the trial court's 
general instructions addressed the comment. 
Passons has failed to demonstrate the prospective juror's statement had 
a continuing impact on his trial. Accordingly, this Court should reject his 
arguments, concerning the disputed statements during voir dire, that the motion 
for mistrial was erroneously denied. 
D. The Police Officer's Statement At Trial To Which Defense Counsel 
Objected And For Which The District Court Promptly Gave A Curative 
Instruction, Was Not Reversible Error, But Was Instead Harmless 
The prosecution's final witness was the police officer who arrested 
Passons. (Tr., pp. 233-50.) To avoid eliciting hearsay, the prosecution asked 
the officer to "describe what was going on rather than what someone said. What 
was going on during the pursuit?" (Tr., p. 234, Ls. 14-18.) The officer started to 
respond, "We were following a suspect from a robbery that occurred -" at which 
point defense counsel objected. (Tr., p. 234, Ls. 19-22.) After hearing argument 
from counsel, the trial court gave the following curative instruction to the jury: 
I want to instruct you that there was no robbery. There has been 
no robbery charged, nor is Mr. Passons a suspect in a robbery at 
the relevant time in question here. So I just want to make sure the 
jury is very well aware of that. 
14 
(Tr., p. 242, Ls. 3-7.) Passons asserts the officer's statement that she was 
following a suspect from a "robbery" was reversible error that deprived him of a 
fair trial. (Appellant's brief, pp. 25-27.) Again, Passons' argument is 
unsupported by the facts or applicable law. 
As already discussed, the jury is presumed to follow the trial court's 
instructions. Thumm, 153 Idaho 533, 544, 285 P.3d 348, 359. The curative 
instruction here very plainly addressed the officer's statement. Although 
Passons asserts he was "denied his right to have jurors consider only relevant 
and competent evidence bearing on his guilt or innocence," he identifies nothing 
in the record indicating that the jury considered anything but the relevant and 
competent evidence before it in rendering its verdict. That Passons was a 
"suspect" in a "robbery" is hardly surprising or prejudicial given that the evidence 
showed he pulled a knife and threatened store employees in the course of a 
burglary. Absent any valid factual or legal support, Passons has failed to show 
the jury disregarded the curative instruction. Passons has therefore failed to 
show that the officer's statement had any impact on the outcome of his trial. 
Accordingly, this Court must reject Passons' argument. 
E. The Record As A Whole Supports The Trial Court's Ruling Denying 
Passons' Motion For Mistrial 
Taking the record as a whole, and in light of applicable law, there is no 
support for Passons' argument that a mistrial was warranted. Passons has cited 
no evidence that any member of his jury was biased. (See Appellant's brief, pp. 
24-27.) Indeed, Passons acknowledges he "does not assert that he was 
deprived his right to an impartial jury based solely on [the prospective juror's] 
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comments." (Appellant's brief, p. 26.) Instead, he argues that the jury -
although impartial - considered improper and inadmissible statements, thus 
depriving him of a fair trial. (Appellant's brief, pp. 26-27.) This argument ignores 
the firmly-established presumption that the jury followed the trial court's 
instructions to only consider the evidence before it, not stricken evidence or 
statements (such as that by the prospective juror) that are not evidence. See 
Thumm, 153 Idaho at 544, 285 P.3d at 359. 
There is no basis to conclude that the disputed comments during voir dire 
and by the state's witness at trial were considered by the jury or otherwise 
affected the outcome of Passons' trial. Passons has thus failed to demonstrate 
prejudice, and failed to show reversible error. Moreover, Passons has failed to 
articulate a valid argument that he was denied a fair trial. Accordingly, this Court 
should reject Passons' arguments that his motions for mistrial were improperly 
denied. 
111. 
Passons Has Failed To Establish That An Accumulation Of Errors Violated His 
Right To A Fair Trial 
"The cumulative error doctrine requires reversal of a conviction when 
there is an accumulation of irregularities, each of which by itself might be 
harmless, but when aggregated, the errors show the absence of a fair trial, in 
contravention of the defendant's constitutional right to due process." State v. 
Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 594, 261 P.3d 853, 871 (2011) (citations, quotations and 
alteration omitted). A necessary predicate to application of the cumulative error 
doctrine is a finding of more than one error. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 230, 
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245 P.3d 961, 982 (201 O); State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 958 P.2d 22 (Ct. 
App. 1998). Passons asserts that "the accumulation of errors in this case 
deprived him of his right to a fair trial." (Appellant's brief, p. 28.) However, 
Passons has failed to show any error, let alone two or more errors. Thus, the 
doctrine of cumulative error does not apply. See, ~. LaBelle v. State, 130 
Idaho 115,121,937 P.2d 427,433 (Ct. App. 1997). 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Passons' judgment 
of conviction. 
DATED this 5th day of June, 2014. 
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